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Abstract. This paper analyses the role played by both competitive pressure (in-
creasing imports) and the restructuring of industries through entry and exit in pro-
ductivity growth of Spanish manufacturing during the eighties, the key period of
its accession to the EEC economy. A GMM panel estimation of the determinants
of corrected Solow residual for 75 manufacturing during 1979–1990, shows that
these forces accounted for 80% of productivity growth, playing an important role
the displacement of inefficient firms by competitive entry.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the role played by competitive pressure (increasing imports) and
the restructuring of industries through entry and exit in productivity growth of Span-
ish manufacturing during the eighties. During this period, Spanish manufacturing
suffered from intense competitive pressure (before, during and after the 1986 EEC
integration) derived from a continuous increase of the penetration of imports while
markets opened at an extraordinary pace, and underwent an extensive restructuring
related to a high rate of firm turnover (with high entry and exit). Manufacturing
productivity increased at high rates, and the impact of the opening and restructuring
of the markets is a relevant question that has not been previously investigated.1
We are grateful to S. Bentolila, F. Bourguignon, T. Coelli, J. Dolado, A. de la Fuente, J. Garcı´a, L.
Rodrı´guez, J. Segura, X. Vives and an anonymous referee for useful comments on previous versions of
this paper. All remaining errors are our own.
1 Our subject is closely related to the question of the effects of increased competitive pressure on
productivity growth. See Caves and Barton (1990) and Vives (1993) for surveys on the subject. Siotis
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Table 1. International comparison of productiv-
ity growth and entry and exit rates in manufac-
turing
Country TFP1 Entry rate2 Exit rate2
(%) (%) (%)
Belgium 3.4 5.8 6.3
Canada 0.4 4.0 4.8
France 1.9 5.0 3.9
Germany 1.3 3.8 4.6
Japan 2.5 N.A. N.A.
Norway 1.0 8.2 8.7
Portugal N.A. 12.3 9.5
UK 3.0 6.5 5.1
USA 1.3 7.7 7.0
Spain 2.7 7.3 9.7
Notes:
1 Annual cumulative rates for the period 1978–
1990. TFP is computed here with the manufac-
turing aggregates in each country, using value-
added as output, and the number of workers as
labour input. Calculations based on “TheOECD
Stan Data Base for Industrial Analysis 1974–
1993” and “Flows and Stocks of Fixed Capital”
(OECD).
2 Averages of annual industry rates for differ-
ent time periods: Belgium (1980–1984), Canada
(1971–1979), France (1980–1982), Germany
(1983–1985), Norway (1980–1985), Portugal
(1983–1986), UK (1974–1979), USA (1963–
1982), and Spain (1979–1990). Source: Cable
and Schwalbach (1991) for all the countries but
France and Spain,Armington (1986) for France,
and our sample for Spain.
The basic facts are as follows. Firstly, manufacturing productivity increase was
aligned with the highest rates experienced by manufacturing in industrial coun-
tries. Table 1 documents this fact with comparable TFP calculations performed
with aggregate data. Secondly, markets of manufactured goods opened at an ex-
traordinary pace. The share of imports in domestic demand (import penetration)
almost doubled, and the fraction of production that domestic firms sold abroad (ex-
port intensity) also increased sharply (see Table A1 in the Data appendix). Thirdly,
manufacturing industries experienced high gross rates of entry and exit, with a high
displacement component (replacement of low productivity firms by more efficient
firms).
Table 1 shows, despite the difficulties in finding fully comparable figures, Span-
ish entry and exit rates were relatively high and, at the same time, unbalanced (the
total number of firms was reduced by about 25% from the beginning of the period
(2003) has recently examined the symmetric question of the effects of the competitive pressure during
1983–1996 on the firm’s margins.
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Table 2. Correlations between manufacturing entry and
exit rates across subperiods1
No correction for fixed industry effects
Exit rate
1979–1982 1983–1986 1987–1990
Entry rate
1979–1982 0.73 0.58 0.57
1983–1986 0.53 0.83 0.76
1987–1990 0.37 0.66 0.92
Correction for fixed industry effects
Exit rate
1979–1982 1983–1986 1987–1990
Entry rate
1979–1982 0.83 0.15 −0.79
1983–1986 0.10 0.66 −0.46
1987–1990 −0.76 −0.44 0.89
Notes:
1We do not report yearly correlations for the sake of
brevity, but very similar results are obtained.
until the moment at which entry and exit redress). Table 2 provides strong evidence
of displacement. While entry and exit are found everywhere to be positively cor-
related across industries (see, for example, Geroski 1995, or Caves 1998), entry
and exit controlling for fixed effects (the industry averages over time of entry and
exit) are expected to be negatively correlated under the usual hypothesis of shared
expectations (what makes entry higher than average must also make exit lower, and
conversely).2 Entry and exit in Spanishmanufacturing during the eighties turn out to
be, on the contrary, positively related, even controlling for fixed effects. In addition,
almost 3/4 of intraindustry correlation coefficients give a positive relationship.
To assess the sources of productivity growth, wemeasure productivity increases
at the industry level for 75 of the 81 industries in which manufacturing is disaggre-
gated by the yearly Spanish industrial survey (Encuesta Industrial) of the Instituto
Nacional de Estadı´stica (INE).We use the Solow residual controlled for the effects
of market power, non-constant returns, and varying utilisation, and we decompose
it according to the role played by a number of explanatory variables in a GMM
panel data regression.3 Previously, we show how an industry Solow residual con-
sists of two parts: a weighted average of firm-level productivity growth, and the
effect derived from output reallocation among firms, and we discuss how entry and
exit rates are likely to impact the second term of this decomposition and the way
to identify displacement effects.
There has been an increasing interest in the impact of turnover on productivity
growth (for an overview see Tybout 1996, and also Caves 1998). Theoretical works
2 This is, for example, what Dunne et al. (1988) found for US manufacturing.
3 In this sense, our paper is close to Geroski (1989), Nickell et al. (1992) or Harrison (1994).
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on industry dynamics provide models in which firms’ entry and exit decisions are
interrelated with their differentials in productivity, and hence they matter for pro-
ductivity growth.4 An increasing number of empirical papers have examined in
different contexts the role played by turnover in productivity growth.5 However,
these studies share the use of firm-level data. In this paper, we argue that identi-
fication of the basic effects is possible using regression methods and information
on the industries’ entry and exit rates. In addition, the relationship to be expected
between entry and exit is largely undetermined.6 We have already pointed out the
evidence in favour of strong displacement effects in our sample. Our exercise sets
a simple but useful framework to distinguish and identify these effects.
Results give a clear picture of the evolution of Spanishmanufacturing efficiency
during the eighties. Productivity growthwas strongly linked to competitive pressure
and the restructuring of industries through two channels: incumbent firms sharply
increased efficiency to survive, and the replacement of less efficient firms by new
entrants also greatly increased efficiency. The role of displacement is confirmed:
exits were closely linked to the emergence of new, more efficient competitors in
the marketplace. The exhaustion of this extraordinary context by the middle of the
90’s may partially explain the productivity growth slowdown that seems to have
followed this period.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the framework
for productivity growth measurement. Section 3 discusses the firm-level determi-
nants while Sect. 4 analyses the relationship of industry-level productivity growth
with the entry and exit rates. Section 5 explains the econometric specification and
results and Sect. 6 presents some concluding remarks.A Data appendix documents
the data and variables used, and three technical appendices explain details on the
measurement of industry composition effects on productivity, the identification of
entry and exit effects and possible relationships between entry and exit.
2 Framework of measurement
Our goal is the measurement of productivity growth effects stemming from two
sources: (i) the increases in the efficiency of the firms that form the industry, given
their shares; and (ii) the changes in the allocation of the industry output among
firms with different efficiency levels. We proceed as follows. Firstly, we compute
the conventional Solow residual θSjt for every industry j and year t. Secondly, we
regress these residuals on the necessary corrections to obtain the “true” increases of
productivity as a remaining factor and then we split them into two parts explained
by the “firm efficiency” and “composition” factors, respectively. Let us explain the
details.
4 See Jovanovic (1982) and Hopenhayn (1992). See also Pakes (1999) for a recent summary of the
framework developed in a series of works to study industry dynamics.
5 See, among others, Baldwin and Gorecki (1991), Baily et al. (1992), Griliches and Regev (1995),
Olley and Pakes (1995), Baldwin (1995), Liu and Tybout (1996) and Aw et al. (2001). Turnover has
been found in general to have a positive contribution to productivity growth, but only quantitatively
important in certain circumstances (deregulation, low sunk costs...).
6 See, for example, Geroski (1995) and Caves (1998).
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An industry Solow residual can be computed using the log-differences of out-
put (y), labour (l), capital (k) and materials (m), provided that the unobservable
elasticities εL, εK and εM are approximated. Traditional productivity analysis re-
placed them by income shares under the assumption that technology is linearly
homogeneous and firms are in a long-run competitive equilibrium. This can still be
used, provided that one simultaneously employs the corrections for the presence of
market power and non-constant returns to scale developed by Hall (1988, 1990).
Let µ be the ratio price/marginal cost, ωL and ωM the income shares of labour
and materials, and γ the returns to scale parameter. We will then regress the Solow
residuals on the term −(µ − 1)[ωL(k − l) + ωM (k − m)] in order to correct for
market power, and will include a term in the form (γ −1)k to estimate the effect of
non-constant returns to scale. In addition, we will use a measure vjt of the degree
of capacity utilisation to deal with the effects of a varying utilization of quasifixed
inputs.7 All this will leave as a residual the remaining “true” productivity growth
θjt unexplained.
The determinants of θjt can be analysed by specifying these values as a mix
of systematic and stochastic components. In particular, industry “true” residuals
can be split up into two additive terms reflecting the two sources of productivity
growth.
Assume that the typical industry consists ofN firms that show different degrees
of efficiency, specified by idiosyncratic terms that multiply a common basic tech-
nology represented by the production function f(.) that, for the moment, we will
assume that is linearly homogeneous.8 Write qi = [1/(1− ai)]f(xi) for the firm i,
where qi represents output,xi is a vector ofK inputs, and ai gives the (approximate)
proportional difference in efficiency of firm i with respect to the benchmark firm
(ai = 0), or its (exact) proportional advantage on unit or marginal costs. Aggregat-
ing across firms, we obtain the production relationship q = [1/(1 −∑
i
aisi)]f(x),
where q and x stand for the aggregated output and vector of inputs, respectively,
si = qi/q represents the market share of firm i, and 1/(1 −
∑
i aisi) is an aggre-
gate efficiency index (see Appendix A). Given this, industry productivity growth
measured by the industry Solow residual can be written as
θ ≡ dq
q
−
∑
k
εk
dxk
xk
=
∑
i
sidai +
∑
i
aidsi (1)
The first term of the last equality in (1) amounts to the weighted sum of firms’
changes in efficiency or individual Solow residuals (dai = dqiqi −
∑
k εk
dxki
xki
); the
second term gives the composition or turnover effect.
Let us now use the specification θjt = θj + θt + xjtβ + ξjt, where θj repre-
sents time-invariant, individual (industry) specific components of the productivity
increases, θt stands for industry-invariant, time productivity effects (stemming from
macroeconomic factors) and ξjt are residual productivity shocks that we will as-
sume are uncorrelated across industries and time. In turn, xjt is a vector of produc-
tivity growth determinants including two very different types of variables: themicro
7 See, however, Delgado et al. (1999) for a more structural approach to the problem.
8 The effects of the absence of linear homogeneity here are likely to be of second order (AppendixA).
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or firm-level determinants of the efficiency increments, and the variables included
to pick up the industry composition change effects. Our complete specification can
now be written as
θsjt = θj + θt − (µjt − 1)WRjt + (γj − 1)kjt + αvjt + xjtβ + ujt (2)
where WRjt = ωLjt(kjt − ljt) +ωMjt(kjt −mjt) and ujt is a zero mean uncor-
related disturbance that includes ξjt as a component.
Equation (2) must be seen as an accounting relationship, fully consistent with
different firms’ behaviour across industries and varying patterns of entry and exit.
Productivity growth (and profitability) as well as the determinants we are going
to detail in the following sections (R&D activities, imports, entry and exit) must,
of course, be taken as jointly determined in long-run equilibrium for each indus-
try, with values that depend on the specific context where firms operate. However,
the estimation of (2) as a separate relationship is useful and legitimate due to two
features. Firstly, the specification is flexible enough to accommodate individual
differences; for instance, it allows for time- persistent heterogeneity in productiv-
ity growth across industries, which our estimation method allows for to be freely
correlated with the explanatory variables. Secondly, explanatory variables can be
assumed to be predetermined and hence the estimation procedure is robust to en-
dogeneity.
3 Firm-level productivity growth determinants
Let us specify the factors that are likely to generate productivity increases at the firm
level: innovative activities, demand and competitive pressure exerted by imports.9
Productivity growth is related to knowledge capital increases (Griliches
1995). We use two indicators adding up total technological effort: the R&D
expenditures/value-added and technological-payments/value-added ratios (RDVA
and TPVA). But some productivity-enhancing innovations are embodied in new
machinery (OECD 1996). As a (rough) indicator, we use the variation in the ratio
stock of capital/number of workers (II).10 High demand states are likely to en-
courage innovations, reorganisations of the work processes, and greater effort. We
assume that these effects depend on the pace of growth of firms’ demand measured
by a weighted sum of the growth rates of buyers’ demand (DEM).11
The most important environmental factor is competitive pressure derived from
foreign competition and, for this purpose, we include the ratio imports/domestic-
demand (IMP). A low degree of competition is likely to sustain productive ineffi-
ciencies in different ways:12 X-inefficiencies, lower information flows hampering
efficiency; enhanced market power favouring socially inefficient decisions. Weak
9 These are the basic firms’ productivity growth sources considered in Geroski (1989), Caves and
Barton (1990) and Nickell et al. (1992). Harrison (1994) focuses on a trade reform.
10 In using this variable we follow Caves and Barton (1990). Of course this ratio also enters the
productivity growth computations, but with a constrained coefficient.
11 This demand variable avoids the endogeneity problems presented by the output growth measures.
12 See Caves and Barton (1990) and Vives (1993).
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competition may be the result of a low degree of foreign interaction in markets (tar-
iffs and other restrictions on trade.) Moves toward free trade are then expected to
have an effect on profitability (well documented) and on efficiency (less studied).13
4 Entry, exit, and productivity growth
Let us establish the relationships between productivity growth and gross entry and
exit rates (GENR and GEXR). On the one hand, productivity growth is expected to
be positively related to both rates, with a direct effect stemming from productivity
changes associated with entry or exit of firms with differing productivity, and an
indirect effect derived from sharpened competition, with a lower impact in the
case of the exit rate due to its additional market concentration effect. On the other
hand, if displacement effects are important, entry and exit rates provide the same
information and their effects are expected to melt. Let us briefly detail these two
insights in turn.
Entrant firms are supposed to have some productivity advantages, or at least
gain them after somemarket experience, and surviving entrants expand their shares
during their first years of life. Exiting firms are supposed to suffer productivity
disadvantages, and their shares fade away.14 Entry and exit are also likely to induce
changes in other shares. If all the firms (entrant, continuing and exiting firms) were
of an identical and invariable size, changes in shares following entry and exit would
be proportional to the entry and exit rates. But firms’ sizes differ and they must be
considered endogenously determined according to the competition framework that
entry and exit contribute to create. Models of imperfect competition, however,
invariably relate output advantages to cost advantages and to the toughness of
competition. This can be used to obtain the definite impact. Appendix B shows that
productivity growth is expected to be positively related to both rates, with a direct
productivity effect, and an indirect effect derived from sharpened competition, with
a lower impact of exit because of market concentration.
Now, let us discuss the relationship between the rates of entry and exit. It is
customary to distinguish at least two different sources of entry and exit (see Geroski
1995). One source is market enlargements or contractions, with origin in demand
or cost changes. Market enlargements would allow the entry of new firms, while
market contractions would induce the exit of redundant firms.15 The other source
is the competitive process, i.e., the replacement of firms already established in the
industry by new entrants, typically because the latter enter the market with superior
technologies. Entry of this type is said to have a displacement effect. Appendix C
formalises these concepts in the simplified context of a market with two types of
firms where, given competition, a fixed cost raises a frontier of possibilities of
the number of firms in the market.16 Competitive entry displaces the less efficient
13 Caves and Barton (1990) find an efficiency effect of imports and productivity growth effects of
lagged imports. Harrison (1994) also finds growth effects of the reform. Tybout (1996) quotes other
examples.
14 Entrant firms can also be less productive than the average but more productive than exiting firms.
15 One source of market contractions may be the increase of imports of equivalent products.
16 We also derive, as an example, the frontier when demand is linear and firms compete a` la Cournot.
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a b
Fig. 1a,b.Entry and exit: displacement andmarket effects. aCompetitive entry andmarket enlargement;
b Market contraction and competitive entry
firms along the frontier. Market enlargements or contractions are determined by
corresponding frontier movements. Panels a and b of Fig. 1 depict the mix of
effects for two supposedly observed changes of firm numbers in the industry.
These two types of entry and exit raise the possibility of very different rela-
tionships between industry entry and exit rates over time. Call αt the displacing
entry rate at time t, λ the rate of displacement, and dt the (absolute value) rate of
change in the number of firms induced by demand. Then, entry and exit rates will
be generated over time according to the expressions et = αt + 1(dt ≥ 0)dt and
st = λαt + 1(dt < 0)dt, where 1(.) stands for the indicator function. If demand
effects dominate, entry and exit rates will be negatively correlated. By contrast, if
competitive entry dominates, entry and exit rates will be strongly positively corre-
lated over time.
5 Econometric estimation and results
Table 3 summarises the results of estimating Eq. (3) with data on 75 manufacturing
industries from 1979 to 1990. The Data appendix offers a detailed description of
the variables. Given the presence of individual effects θj (individual time-invariant
effects in the growth rates) that are likely to be correlatedwith explanatory variables,
we always estimate differencing out these effects by using the first differences’
transformation of the equation. We also include a set of time dummies, and we
instrument the variable which accounts for market power with cross-section lagged
values at t − 2 and t − 3, in the framework of the general method of moments
(see Arellano and Bond 1991). Estimates 1 to 6 present selected alternatives of
specification. Columns include the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions as
well as the residual autocorrelation tests m1 and m2. The validity of instruments
is always accepted.
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Estimation of (2) is carried out by substituting the expression PCM/(1 −
PCM) for (µ − 1), where PCM stands for the usual price/cost margin, and by
forming the compound variable MWRjt = PCMjt/(1 − PCMjt)WRjt. Its
coefficient, very significant and not far from −1 in almost every equation, can be
interpreted both as a confirmation of the presence ofmarket power and the reliability
of the correction. On the other hand, we group the sectors in which increasing,
constant or decreasing returns to scale can be expected and we construct a set of
three dummies (IRD, KRD and DRD) that, interacted with the capital growth
variable, give estimates of three average values for the scale parameter (γ−1).17 The
coefficients corresponding to the industries with increasing and constant returns to
scale are in general not significantly different from zero, and hence the restriction
that they are equal to unity may be accepted at the 5% level. However, all the return
parameters cannot be constrained to have a value of one (estimate 2). The indicator
of the degree of utilisation, when included, is not significant (estimate 3). This
probably suggests that the demand indicator is enough to pick up changes induced
by fluctuations in utilisation.
Estimation reveals the following findings. Firstly, R&D expenditures have a
positive and significant impact with a lag, though it is impossible to find a signif-
icant impact of technological payments. This suggests an asymmetric impact on
productivity during the period of the innovative activities carried out by the firm,
with respect to the acquisition of licenses of available technologies. On the con-
trary, investment intensity tends to show a positive and significant contemporaneous
impact on productivity, which seems to confirm the role of embodied innovations.
Secondly, import penetration attracts a strong and significant positive coefficient
when included in the equation with a lag.18 We interpret this effect as the increase
in firms’ productivity induced by competitive pressure, as explained in Sect. 3.
Finally, gross entry and exit rates are positive and significant determinants of
productivitywhen included separately (estimates 1 to 3 and 4, respectively). In addi-
tion, the coefficient on the exit rates is lower. In any case, the effects tend to decrease
and are imprecisely estimated when both rates are simultaneously included (esti-
mate 5). These estimates are fully consistent with the theoretical insights developed
in Sect. 4. They point out that turnover is an important determinant of productivity
growth and that entry and exit rates are at the origin of the same productivity gains,
confirming both the presence and importance of displacement. 19,20
17 Sectors’ grouping is based on the cost function estimates in Vela´zquez (1993).
18 Export intensity was also tried and did not show any additional effect.
19 A more structural model would include separate entry and exit equations. Under the displacement
hypothesis, exit is a function of demand growth and entry, and entry is a function of demand and
profitability expectations. A very simple model along these lines give the following
GEXR = 4.60(12.5)− 0.20(−3.8)DEM + 0.81(15.9)GENR + u and GENR = 5.80(22.8)+ 0.52(5.3)DEM + v
20 Structural change tests of the imports and entry impact have been performed by allowing a different
coefficient in the post-entry subperiod (1987–1990).A change in the impact of imports is clearly rejected,
but the test on turnover suggests that its role was somewhat more important before 1986.
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It seems natural to define the expression θ¯ = 1JT
∑
j
∑
t xjtβˆ =
∑
k βˆkx¯k,
where x¯k is the sample mean of the k-th variable and βˆk its estimated coefficient,
as an estimate of the systematic component of productivity growth.21 This estimate
can be used to evaluate the role of each determinant. The bottom right part of Ta-
ble 3 presents the decomposition of productivity growth. This decomposition gives
a nice picture of the sources of the productivity increase in the Spanish manufac-
turing sector during the eighties. There is an extremely important influence of the
pressure stemming from imports on productivity growth (50% of the average pro-
ductivity growth), but another important source is the structural change in industries
stemming from entry and exit (30%). Lastly, the contribution of R&D emerges as
the remaining important determinant (13%).
Equation (2) can also be used to assess the role of the corrections to the conven-
tionally computed Solow residual and hence to evaluate the true overall productivity
growth. The top right part of Table 3 summarises the results of this decomposition.
The average of the conventional Solow residual (our dependent variable) is 0.97%.
Average corrected productivity growth is evaluated at 1.58% per year. Therefore,
the conventional Solow residual is, in this case, a downward biased approximation
of the true productivity growth.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines productivity growth in a sample of 75 Spanish manufacturers
during the eighties, the period in which Spanish manufacturing was under intense
competitive pressure derived from the EEC integration and showed an extensive
structural change, reflected mostly in high and unbalanced gross rates of firm entry
and exit.
Results show the important role of competitive pressure and structural change
through a process of creative destruction with the displacement of inefficient firms.
From the point of view of industrial policy, the results firstly confirm the accumula-
tion of productive inefficiencies when competition is weak, particularly in the case
of insufficient interaction with a more competitive environment, as was the case
for Spanish manufacturing in relation to Europe by the beginning of the eighties.
But they also indicate that the easing of market constraints, together with agents’
expectations of the irreversibility of this process, may generate amuchmoremarket
dynamic environment capable of changing market structure and performance in a
relatively short time.
21 It also seems natural to define θ¯ including a constant βˆ0, whose value cannot be estimated separately
from θj and θt except under the assumption E(θj) = E(θt) = 0. In practice we operate as if there
were a constant with a value proportional to
∑
k βˆkx¯k .
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Data appendix
The sample consists of 75 of the 81 industries in which manufacturing is disaggre-
gated by the yearly Spanish industrial survey (Encuesta Industrial) of the Instituto
Nacional de Estadı´stica (INE). There are no entry and exit data for the other six
industries. The variables v, RDVA and TPVA are available only for a lower level of
disaggregation of manufacturing. Variable sample means are reported in the Data
appendix Table.
Productivity growth (θS): Computed using a Tornqvist index using the log dif-
ferences (%) of real gross product, total hours of work, real capital stock and real
consumption of materials. Shares are computed as the average shares of labour
costs and material expenditures in gross production between years t and t − 1.
Capital stock (K): Computed recursively starting from an initial estimation based
on official engineering estimates of capital-product ratios at the time, and referring
its value to 1980 prices.
Price-costmargin (PCM): Calculated as (gross production-labour costs-subsidies-
cost of materials) over total sales.
Utilisation indicator (v): Yearly average of an indicator of use of capacity.
R&D intensity (RDVA): Ratio R&D expenditures/value added (◦/◦◦).
Technological payments intensity (TPVA) : Ratio technological payments/value
added (◦/◦◦).
Investment intensity (II): Ratio real capital stock variation/number of workers.
Gross entry rate (GENR): Plant creation divided by the total number of plants in
the preceding year.
Gross exit rate (GEXR): Plant exit divided by the total number of plants in the
preceding year.
Import penetration (IMP): Ratio imports/domestic demand (sales+imports-
exports).
Industry demand (DEM): Industry demand rate of change indicator computed as
a weighted average of the rates of change of production in the industries that buy
from that industry, and the rates of change of consumption of the final consumers
that buy the produced goods.
Appendix A. Firms’ heterogeneity, industry composition and productivity
growth
Let qi = [1/(1 − ai)]f(xi) be the production function of firm i, i = 1, .., N ,
with f(xi) linearly homogeneous. The associated cost function is C(w, qi) =
c(w)(1−ai)qi, wherew represents the vector of input prices, and input demands can
be written as xi = δc(w)δw (1−ai)qi (Shephard’s lemma). Using linear homogeneity,
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it can be immediately shown that
∑
i f(xi) = f(x), where x =
∑
i xi. Hence, q =
1/(1−∑i aisi)f(x). Taking logs, using ln(1+x) ≈ x and differencing, we obtain
expression (1). Now let f(xi) be homogeneous of degree γ. Then
∑
i f(xi) =
[(1 −∑i aisi)/(∑i(1 − ai)1/γs1/γi )γ ]f(x) ≈ [1 − I(a, s)(γ − 1)]f(x), where
I(a, s) = ln
∑
i(1−ai)si−
∑
i
(1−ai)si∑
i(1−ai)si ln(1−ai)si and the last (approximate)
equality is obtained using a first-order approximation around γ = 1. If all firms
were equally efficient (ai = a), I(a, s) would take the value of the entropic index
−∑i si ln si, and if all firms were of the same size (si = 1/N), the index would
simply be lnN .
Appendix B. Productivity growth and the rates of entry and exit
A market consists of two types of firms. Firms of type 1 present a productivity
or cost advantage “a” over the firms of type 2. For simplicity, there is no way to
transform a type 2 firm into a type 1 firm. Entry consists of type 1 firms and exit
affects type 2 firms. Let N1 and N2 be the numbers of firms, N1 + N2 = N , and
s1 and s2 their market shares. Call the joint shares Nisi, S1 and S2. Productivity
change derived from a change in the industry composition of firms is adS1 or
−adS2. S1 can be written as a function of the proportion of firms of type 1 in
the marketplace, w = N1/N , and the relative advantage in output of this type of
firm, v = (q1 − q2)/q1, as S1 = w/(1 − (1 − w)v). At the same time, given
the productivity or cost advantage of firms of type 1 and the behaviour in the
market, v itself can be considered an increasing function of w and N . This is
the case, for example, when market demand is either linear or of the constant
elasticity type and firms compete a` la Cournot. Therefore S1 can be expressed as
S1 = S1(w, v(w,N)), where δS1δw > 0,
δS1
δv > 0, and we can assume
δv
δw > 0 and
δv
δN > 0. Differencing S1 and expressing dw and dN/N in terms of the entry and
exit rates, e = dN1/N and s = dN2/N , an equation of the type ds1 = βee + βss
is easily obtained, where the β’s depend on three effects of the entry and exit
rates: “direct”, “competition” and “concentration”. The effect of entry is always
expected to be positive, while the effect of the exit rate will be positive if the direct
and competition effects of exit prevail over the concentration effects (as we can
expect).
Appendix C. A case of the frontier of possibilities of firm numbers
Assume the same two-firms setting of Appendix B. Suppose in addition that op-
eration in the industry implies some fixed cost or minimum profits. Then, given
demand, cost conditions and conduct, there will be a maximum number of firms
of type 2 that will be able to operate with non-negative profits for each number of
type 1 firms. This defines a frontier of possibilities of firm numbers in the market
(see Fig. 1). Entry with displacement effects refers to the entry and exit associated
with movements along this frontier. The rate dN2/dN1 reports the number of type
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2 firms that will be replaced by a firm of type 1. Entry and exit by market enlarge-
ments or contractions refer to the entry and exit associated with movements of the
frontier. As an example, assume that N1 type 1 firms and N2 type 2 firms compete
a` la Cournot with constant marginal costs c1 and c2. The inverse market demand
function is then p = d − bQ, with Q = N1q1 + N2q2. Assuming a fixed cost F ,
profits of a type 2 firm can be written as π2 = 1b [
d−c2
N+1 − N1(c2−c1)N+1 ]2 −F . Equating
this expression to zero, we obtain the equation for the frontier
N2 =
(
d − c2√
bF
− 1
)
−
(
1 +
c2 − c1√
bF
)
N1
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